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The Ethics of Corporate Governance: A (South) African Perspective 
Abstract  
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to review the developments in South African corporate 
governance since the end of apartheid, with a view to identifying themes and points of 
convergence and/or divergence with other models. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The paper presents a critical review South African corporate governance in the context of 
political and economic developments.  Where relevant, aspects of corporate governance 
theory (in particular the stakeholder and shareholder debate) are considered in the South 
African context. 
Findings 
South African corporate governance can be seen to broadly follow an Anglo-American with 
the notable exception of the stakeholder approach of the two King reports. This approach 
emphasises the responsibilities of companies to various stakeholders and encourages 
stakeholder engagement as an integral element of company strategy. There has not, however, 
been any substantial incorporation of stakeholder interests into formal corporate governance 
structures such as board structure and financial reporting. 
Originality/value 
A review of South African corporate governance is timely given the probable release of the 
third King report in 2009, together with new company legislation.  
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The Ethics of Corporate Governance: A (South) African Perspective 
Developing countries and emerging markets face different needs and demands when 
compared to their counterparts in the developed world, and consequently their institutions 
and structures can be expected to differ. With regard to corporate governance, these countries 
typically require a system that will attract international investment and enhance economic 
growth through the provision of stability and confidence. At the same time, however, these 
countries often face political uncertainty and social unrest, they may experience conflict 
internally or in their region, and suffer from an economic volatility that may seemingly be 
related to the whims of developed nations. South Africa is such a country, and yet since the 
end of apartheid in the early 1990s has maintained a sound financial and corporate 
environment. 
This paper reviews the developments in South African corporate governance since the end of 
apartheid. The themes and aspects that are specific to South Africa and that set it apart from 
the dominant Anglo-American corporate governance model are identified in the existing 
literature. This entails some consideration of the approach taken, and whether this reflects a 
shareholder or stakeholder orientation. The influence that South Africa may have on the rest 
of the continent is considered throughout. The paper concludes with some discussion of 
future prospects and the issue of convergence. 
 
1. Developments in South African corporate governance 
Like many other Commonwealth countries, South African corporate structures generally 
resemble those of the UK. Company law was influenced strongly by the English Companies 
(Consolidation) Act of 1908, and a South African Companies Act was adopted in 1973 after a 
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local review. Common law continues to play a strong role, however, and although they are 
not legally binding, English cases still carry some weight (Sutherland, 2004).   Listing on the 
JSE (formerly the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) is the primary means of raising finance, 
banks generally maintain arms-length relationships with their clients and single-tiered boards 
are standard. In 1992 the King Committee was established, under the chairmanship of 
Mervyn King, with the task of providing a set of corporate governance guidelines for South 
Africa. This follows the release of the Cadbury Report in the UK in 1992 and an increasing 
interest in the subject worldwide. The first King report covered many of the same issues as 
the Cadbury Report, with considerable attention paid to the board of directors and the 
protection of shareholders. Some mention was made, however, of non-financial concerns and 
engagement with stakeholders.  
South Africa at the time was in the throes of political transition, with the African National 
Congress (ANC) having been unbanned in 1990, Nelson Mandela being released in the same 
year and the whites-only referendum on support for the reforms being held in 1992. With the 
country gradually losing its pariah status and rejoining the international community in all 
areas (from arts and culture to sport as well as politics), the first King report that was released 
in 1994 can be seen both as an effort to reinforce the fundamentals of a capitalist corporate 
system in the light of significant political uncertainty and a means of aligning the economy 
with international trends and imperatives. The importance of attracting international capital 
was obvious given the poor state of the economy and the overwhelming socio-economic 
needs that would be faced by the first post-apartheid government. Interestingly, at roughly the 
same time (1993), the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants began their 
Harmonisation and Improvement project with International Accounting Standards (see 
Edwards et al. (2007) for a more detailed discussion). These developments all suggest an 
Anglo-American corporate governance orientation, although it should be noted that control of 
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the economy was firmly in the hands of the minority white population, and even within this 
group company ownership was highly concentrated with the use of pyramidal structures, 
cross-holdings and interlocking directorships. 
The first ANC government (1994-1999) did not overhaul the economy or corporate 
landscape. Pre-election fears based on the party’s alliance with the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) proved 
unfounded. Over the five years, the government in fact moved away from its Reconstruction 
and Development Programme, initially intended to prioritise redistribution over growth, 
towards the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic plan, reversing the 
priority and following a ‘trickle-down’ approach to poverty alleviation. This was coupled 
with the unbundling of the large conglomerates that dominated the JSE, a commitment to the 
privatisation (or partial privatisation) of para-statal organisations, low inflation rate targeting 
and fiscal austerity. Together with the increasingly open nature of the South African economy 
following the end of apartheid, the post-apartheid corporate environment has thus resembled 
the Anglo-American model; Adelzadeh (1996, p.67) indeed suggests that the shift to the 
GEAR strategy was indicative of “a lame succumbing to the policy dictates and ideological 
pressures of the international financial institutions”. 
Nevertheless, a number of statutes were passed in the 1990s which aimed at directly 
improving the conditions of the majority of South Africans, as well as redressing the 
economic inequality inherited from apartheid. These include the Labour Relations Act of 
1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 and the Employment Equity Act of 
1998. The latter, in particular, represents a direct attempt to improve the participation of 
black South Africans in the formal economy through positive discrimination. 
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With favourable prospects for economic growth and the gradual emergence of a black middle 
class, there was no radical change in economic policy (and consequently the corporate 
environment) from 1999 with the presidency of Thabo Mbeki. Following the increased 
sophistication of corporate governance worldwide, as well as continuing local needs, a 
second King committee was established in 2000. Armstrong et al. (2005) note four principles 
that guided the development of the second King report: to review the first report and evaluate 
its currency, to extend the inclusive approach by which the interests of all stakeholders are 
considered, to consider risk and internal controls assurance, and to provide recommendations 
for enforcement. The result was the King II report published in 2002, which addressed many 
of the corporate governance issues which had been so recently highlighted with the failures of 
Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat, amongst others. Again, much of the report was similar to 
developments elsewhere, particularly the UK. A review of the topics covered by King II and 
corporate governance reports issued in the UK (the Combined Code, the Turnbull Guidance, 
the Smith Guidance and the Higgs report) reveals that very similar issues are addressed; 
topics dealt with include boards of directors, directors’ remuneration, internal control and risk 
management, and accounting and audit.  The report’s distinctive feature, however, was the 
attention placed on non-financial corporate governance concerns, notably the engagement 
with stakeholders and the emphasis on sustainability. The introduction to the report places it 
firmly within the South African context, emphasising both the socio-economic reality of 
much of the population and the influence of traditional African culture and values (including 
ubuntu). The report also includes a section entitled Integrated Sustainability Reporting and 
recommends that companies report regularly on their social and environmental engagement 
over and above any legal requirements. The inclusion of stakeholder concerns in company 
strategy is also strongly advocated.   
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The King II report is notable for explicitly adopting an ‘inclusive’ (i.e. stakeholder) approach 
to corporate governance, a factor that sets South Africa apart from the dominant Anglo-
American model. South African imperatives were reinforced in the passing of the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003, which established a formal structure that 
effectively rewarded companies meeting certain criteria (usually related to the level of black 
ownership, employment and procurement practices). Broadly speaking, the corporate 
governance environment in South Africa can thus be considered to be a modified Anglo-
American model. The links with the dominant Anglo-American corporate governance 
systems can also be seen to have strengthened in several ways:  International Financial 
Reporting Standards were officially adopted from 2005 (although International Accounting 
Standards had been mirrored for some time), the Auditing Professions Act was passed in 
2005, bringing the structure of the profession more in line with other Anglo-American 
countries (see Odendaal and De Jager, 2008), and a number of high-profile South African 
companies moved their primary listings to the UK or USA. Financial (and corporate 
governance) failures have also surfaced, from MacMed in 1999, through LeisureNet 
(liquidated in 2000) and Fidentia in 2007, although none of these were of the magnitude or 
profile of Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat. 
 
2. Themes and context 
Much of the reflection and discussion of corporate governance in South Africa has focussed 
on the King II report. Understandably, this relates largely to the distinctive nature of the 
report, and how it relates to South African needs. As noted above, the report adopts an 
‘inclusive’ approach, which can be directly linked (if not equated) with the stakeholder model 
of corporate governance that has its roots in the stakeholder theory of Edward Freeman, and 
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which stands in opposition to the model of shareholder primacy maintained in the UK and 
USA (and that, in turn, refers back to Milton Friedman’s business philosophy). The 
Introduction to the King II report includes seven characteristics of good corporate governance 
(IOD, 2002, Introduction, para. 18): discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility. These corporate governance ‘virtues’ extend 
the four traditional principles identified in the Millstein report (presented to the OECD in 
1998) of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. Although there is clearly 
significant overlap, and while discipline and independence can be considered to be equally 
important in other corporate governance reports, the specific inclusion of social responsibility 
(in addition to responsibility itself) is notable. In this regard, the report envisages that: 
“A well-managed company will be aware of, and respond to, social issues, placing a 
high priority on ethical standards. A good corporate citizen is increasingly seen as one 
that is non-discriminatory, nonexploitative, and responsible with regard to 
environmental and human rights issues.” (IOD, 2002, Introduction, para. 18.7) 
The report continues by appealing to the indirect economic benefits that such practices are 
likely to accrue. 
Rossouw (2002, 2005a) and West (2006) both explicitly refer to the ethical philosophies that 
underlie the approach taken in King II and note how there is evidence within the report of 
both normative and instrumental stakeholder theory. The direct link that can be drawn 
between the report and ethical theory also suggests that this most distinctive characteristic of 
South African corporate governance could represent an underlying difference in ethical 
outlook or judgement rather than a mere difference in business protocol. 
A number of authors draw attention to the specific needs faced by developing countries and 
South Africa in particular, and question the suitability and effectiveness of the King II report 
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in this regard. Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse (2002, p.314), for example, summarise the 
dilemma succinctly:  
“Within the framework of promoting a middle-class elite, the Anglo-American 
shareholder model is distinctly attractive. The Anglo-American model is geared to 
generating wealth rapidly. The shareholder model, however, holds the disadvantage of 
promoting a social divide between rich and poor.” 
Spisto (2002) sees the use of two-tiered boards as a solution and argues strongly for their 
adoption in South Africa, following the German example, thereby providing for employee 
participation and improving productivity. Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse (2002) also point 
to the use of a two-tiered board structure as a means of more effectively addressing 
stakeholder concerns, and thereby enabling companies to fulfil the wider responsibilities 
advocated in King II.  Changing from a unitary to a two-tiered board structure, however, 
represents a change at the highest level, would require a complete re-evaluation of how the 
company is governed, and could eventuate in the formal inclusion of various stakeholders. 
There has not, to date, been any real open consideration or debate around the issue of two-tier 
boards in South Africa, and it is likely that responses to any such suggestion would include 
appealing to successful examples of unitary boards in the UK and USA.  
In a similar vein, it could be suggested that the development of financial reporting to 
stakeholders would assist the company in meeting its extended obligations to the various 
stakeholders. The King II report, however, while acknowledging that the company is 
responsible to its stakeholders, maintains that accountability is limited to shareholders, and no 
attempt is made to alter or supplement the shareholder-oriented financial reporting system 
(now in line with IFRS). The issues of board structure and stakeholder accountability stand in 
contrast to the report’s recommendations for sustainability reporting, stakeholder engagement 
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and codes of ethics, where the latter could be considered to be existing trends in Anglo-
American countries, and which, arguably, can be implemented (or be seen to implemented) 
without a significant change in the way the company is governed.  In this respect the King II 
report cannot be considered to present a wholesale stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance, but rather encourages wider stakeholder awareness and responsibility, while 
maintaining a predominantly shareholder-oriented Anglo-American system. 
Another important consideration is the degree to which South Africa’s corporate governance 
is representative of corporate governance on the African continent as a whole. Vaughn and 
Ryan’s (2006) article entitled Corporate governance in South Africa: A bellwether for the 
continent? specifically examines the country’s corporate governance and how it provides a 
model for the rest of the continent. Armstrong et al.’s (2005) report is entitled Corporate 
Governance: South Africa, a pioneer in Africa, and similarly evokes the idea of breaking new 
ground which others can follow. Rossouw’s (2005b) analysis of corporate governance reports 
across Africa (mostly sub-Saharan Africa) reveals that all but the Nigerian report advocate an 
inclusive, stakeholder oriented corporate governance. That they all recommend a unitary 
board structure suggests some regional convergence; however when one considers the 
differences between countries such a conclusion must be reserved. Firstly, there are 
significant differences between South Africa and other African countries in terms of its 
history (and consequently the inherited system) and economic development. Despite its 
socio-economic problems and disparities South Africa’s financial infrastructure is of a similar 
standard and complexity to many developed countries, and maintains an active and efficient 
capital market; the same cannot be said of any other African country. Secondly, there are 
differences between other African countries that can impact on their corporate governance. 
Recent political turmoil in Zimbabwe reveals a significant distrust of Western nations and 
institutions amongst some parties, and strengthened economic ties with some Asian nations 
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(such as China and Malaysia) may suggest an alternative trajectory. Zimbabwe’s politically-
stable neighbour Botswana, however, has enjoyed consistent economic growth and is more 
likely to follow the South African model, even with a fledgling capital market. 
 
3. Prospects 
The most prominent recent development that directly impacts on South Africa’s corporate 
governance is the review of the Companies Act that has culminated in the presentation of a 
new Companies Bill to parliament in 2008. Considered by many to be long overdue, the new 
legislation is intended to bring the country in line with worldwide developments over recent 
decades. The changes include simplifying company formation, reducing the financial 
reporting requirements for smaller companies, specifying the qualifications, standards of 
conduct and liabilities of directors (including liability for false or misleading financial 
statements), the establishment of a Takeover Panel and a Financial Reporting Standards 
Council to provide oversight.  
In addition and in response to the new company legislation, the Institute of Directors 
anticipates a new corporate governance report, King III, to be released in 2009. It appears that 
the new report is intended to coincide with the new legislation (and also considering 
developments such as the Auditing Profession Act and public sector governance reforms) 
rather than being a reaction to any crisis or representing any significant change in approach. It 
is likely, therefore, that King III will adopt the same overall stance as King II, encouraging 
companies to take a stakeholder approach while maintaining formal structures with a 
shareholder orientation.  
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Political change is another possible source of change in the corporate environment. Both the 
Mandela and Mbeki governments were favourable to business. However, at the end of 2007 
Jacob Zuma was elected president of the ANC, with strong support from the SACP and 
COSATU, and with a mandate to focus on social upliftment. He is likely to be elected 
president of the country in 2009, but how the new government will address the country’s 
socio-economic problems, and how this will affect the corporate environment remains to be 
seen. 
Regarding regional convergence, the differences between countries mean that while the 
developments in South Africa provide an example for other countries to base their own 
practices on, many African countries do not have the size and sophistication of markets, or 
regulatory frameworks, for the concept of convergence to be meaningful.  For many, the need 
for economic growth overshadows considerations of governance, and it is likely that the 
biggest influence on corporate governance in individual African countries will be their 
partners in trade and investment. Given the rise in the Chinese and Indian economies, it is 
possible that corporate governance in many African countries will more closely follow an 
Asian model than Europe or America. 
In terms of convergence with developed countries, there is clearly a lot of similarity between 
South Africa and other Commonwealth countries. Developments in formal corporate 
structures have been influenced largely by the UK. There has been little explicit consideration 
of alternative corporate governance models from other parts of the world, including those of 
Continental Europe and East Asia. There is also little indication that there will be any 
significant divergence from Anglo-American structures in future. The adoption of a 
stakeholder orientation in the King reports, which is certain to continue, does however 
provide a significant point of difference with Anglo-American jurisdictions. As there has 
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been a clear increase in corporate social responsibilities in Anglo-American countries in 
recent years, without some more formal inclusion of stakeholder interests in South African 
corporate governance structures, this point of difference may diminish in significance. With a 
business sector that is unlikely to want to ‘rock the boat’, it is possible that any future 
divergence from Anglo-American jurisdictions will come from political developments and 
government rather than private sector initiatives. 
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